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Abstract—One of the most disruptive innovations in next-
generation cellular networks will be the massive support of
Machine Type and IoT (MTC/IoT) communications. This type
of communications exhibits very different requirements from
traditional cellular traffic: in MTC/IoT, the same base station
may need to provide service to thousands of nodes, each of
them transmitting small and infrequent data. In this context, it is
critical to evaluate the impact of MTC/IoT on the Evolved Packet
Core (EPC) network. We do so by quantifying analytically the
signaling load on the EPC due to MTC/IoT bearer instantiation
in both standard and 3GPP IoT-optimized LTE networks. Our
analysis, validated via simulation, provides useful insights on the
impact of the traffic load on each component of the EPC, as well
as on the system design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart cities, connected cars, wearables and industry 4.0 are
only some of the examples that promote the use of Machine
Type and IoT (MTC/IoT) communications in everyday life.
The number of objects with sensing and communications
capabilities are therefore envisioned to increase exponentially
in the next few years, both by the academic community [1]
and the general public [2]. While MTC/IoT communications,
hereinafter referred to as IoT, have been typically relying on
ad-hoc solutions in the recent past, large-scale deployments,
as the ones required in the aforementioned examples, demand
broad, reliable and efficient connectivity.
In this scenario, the cellular network emerges as a good can-
didate infrastructure for large-scale IoT systems [3], although
they are very different from those supporting human-type com-
munications. Most notably, a base station, instead of serving
a handful of terminals, has to serve thousands of objects in
IoT, each of them transmitting infrequent and small data. This
implies that, for each data item an IoT source has to transmit, a
control procedure may need to be executed for establishing an
end-to-end connectivity, i.e., the so-called bearer instantiation.
Such a control procedure involves the traffic sources, the base
stations, and the cellular network, i.e., the Evolved Packet
Core (EPC) network. Thus, the battery of the IoT sources,
which typically has very little capacity, and the EPC may
be strained by this enormous amount of control traffic. In
order to address this shortcoming, 3GPP recently standardized
some enhancements to the control procedures required by IoT
traffic sources [4], including: the NB-IoT, a dedicated variant
of LTE supporting only limited functionalities; the User-Plane
C-IoT optimization, where the bearer for the IoT source is only
suspended if the terminal does not send frequent data, instead
of being released; and the Control-Plane C-IoT optimization,
where end-to-end connectivity is granted to the IoTs at almost
no cost.
The enhancements introduced by 3GPP allow reducing as
much as possible the interaction of the IoT sources with the
cellular infrastructure, hence reducing the control procedures
overhead at the IoT source side. Nonetheless, the effect of such
enhancements on the EPC components is still unclear. Our
objective in this paper is to shed some light on the performance
of the EPC when standard or IoT enhanced control procedures
are in place. This is particularly relevant in the context of the
virtualization of the mobile core network, where the capacity
of each component of the EPC can be tuned over time. How
such tuning is performed depends on the control traffic load,
thus the knowledge of the behavior of the EPC when handling
thousands of IoT sources is essential to formulate scaling
in/out algorithms of the EPC component capacity. More in
detail, our main contributions are as follows:
 by adopting a realistic IoT traffic model, we analytically
evaluate the average number of bearer instantiations per
second that the EPC has to manage;
 we assess which entity of the EPC bears the highest
burden;
 we compare the standard and enhanced procedures for
the support of IoT traffic in cellular networks, and high-
light the effectiveness of the enhancements that 3GPP
standards recently introduced.
II. RELATED WORK
Several works have dealt with IoT in the context of cellular
networks, highlighting the shortcomings exhibited by control
procedures. In particular, [5] has shown that an NFV-based
solution to EPC implementation outperforms a solution ex-
ploiting SDN only, when a large number of IoT sources have
to be served, i.e., under high control traffic conditions. The
study in [6], instead, extends the standard EPC by including
new entities that are dedicated to IoT traffic. Although such
an approach can improve the system performance, it implies
several modifications to standard specifications.
Fewer works have aimed at evaluating the control traffic
load that the EPC components have to bear if standard or
enhanced bearer instantiations are in place. Among these, [7]
proposes a mechanism for the aggregation of different IoT
bearers and evaluates analytically its effectiveness over the
standard procedure. The IoT traffic model adopted in [7],
however, is very simple and 3GPP IoT optimized procedures
are not considered. Similar observations hold for the study in
[8], which analitically models control procedures of video and
IoT traffic on the EPC.
At last [9] proposes the IoT traffic model we adopt in this
paper. The focus of [9], however, is on the simulation study
of scenarios with millions IoT sources: neither an analytical
evaluation of the IoT traffic nor a study of the EPC control
procedures are presented.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, our purpose is to shed light on the performance
of the EPC when it has to handle the control traffic of
thousands IoT sources. Thus, after a brief description of
the notation adopted in the following sections (Sec. III-A),
we introduce the main components we will refer to in our
analysis, i.e., the EPC (Sec. III-B), the bearer instantiation
procedure (Sec. III-B1), and the model we adopt for IoT traffic
(Sec. III-C).
A. Notation
We indicate with P(X) the probability of a specific event
X . The probability mass function (pmf) of a discrete random
variable X at x is denoted by fX(x) = P(X = x). Finally,
the evaluation at x of the pmf of X conditioned to the random
variable Y , when Y = y, is denoted by fXjY (xjy) = P(X =
xjY = y).
B. EPC network
The EPC includes four main components [4], as depicted
in Fig. 2:
 Serving Gateway (S-GW), mainly routes data traffic and
acts as anchor point when the terminals perform handover
between eNBs;
 PDN Gateway (P-GW), acts as ingress and egress point
of the mobile network, and is responsible for policy
enforcement;
 Mobility Management Entity (MME), is the termina-
tion point of the terminals control channels. The MME
authenticates and tracks registered terminals and, most
importantly, it handles bearer activation, i.e., the MME
instantiates valid logical connections between the termi-
nals and the P-GW;
 Home Subscriber Server (HSS), is a central database
where terminal-related information are stored. The HSS
assists the MME in the terminal authentication.
MME, P-GW and S-GW are different pieces of equipment,
or, in the case of a virtual EPC, they typically run on different
machines; the MME is then connected only to the S-GWs
for bearer establishment and mobility management, while the
P-GW handles the data traffic to/from several S-GWs. The
MME mainly provides two important and recurrent control
traffic procedures to ordinary terminals: bearer instantiation
and handover. Nevertheless, 3GPP has introduced a new
variant of LTE, namely, the NB-IoT, which does not support
handover. In this case, at each change of eNB, an IoT source
simply requests a new bearer instantiation when it has some
traffic to send/receive. For this reason, in this paper we
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Fig. 1: Standard attach and bearer instantiation procedure.
focus on the control traffic due to bearer instantiation by IoT
sources, leaving the analysis of handover procedures to future
investigation.
1) Bearer instantion: In cellular networks a terminal can
send or receive traffic only if there exists a logical connection
between the terminal and the corresponding P-GW, i.e., only if
the MME has completed the bearer instantiation procedure for
that terminal. Whenever the time interval between subsequent
packets of a terminal is larger than the Inactivity Timer of
the eNB, the network resources associated with the terminal’s
bearer are released and the terminal gets detached from
the network. In this case, before some new traffic can be
transferred, the terminal has to re-attach to the cellular network
and request a new bearer instantiation [8].
Fig. 1 details the attach/bearer instantiation procedure. In
total, the MME has to perform six operations: attach, authen-
tication, identity verification, session creation, context setup,
and setting of the bearer options. As shown in the figure, if
no previous terminal’s context information is present in the
network, the MME is required to process nine different control
messages for each attach/bearer establishment.
The 3GPP enhancements introduced in the standard to
favor MTC/IoT communications, namely, Attach without PDN
connectivity, User Plane C-IoT optimization and Control Plane
C-IoT optimization, aim at reducing the energy consumption
of IoT sources by reducing the interaction between the IoT
sources and the infrastructure during the control procedures.
They indeed differ in the degree of interaction between the
IoT sources and the infrastructure, as discussed below.
 Attach without PDN connectivity: at the expiration of the
Inactivity Timer, the network resources associated with
the bearer are released, but the terminal is not detached.
When the traffic source has some new traffic to transmit,
it has to establish a new bearer, but it does not have to re-
attach, or to initiate a new session. Attach without PDN
connectivity may be used for any type of terminal, and
it is not specific to IoT sources;
 User Plane C-IoT optimization: at the expiration of the
Inactivity Timer, the bearer of the IoT source is not
released, but it is just suspended. When a new packet is
transmitted from/to the IoT source, the bearer is quickly
reactived;
 Control Plane C-IoT optimization: it allows the IoT
source to transmit only small data. Instead of asking
actively for a bearer instantiation, the IoT source piggy-
bags its data in a control message towards the MME.
The MME is responsible for the bearer instantiation, the
integrity check of the IoT data, and the data forwarding
towards the right S-GW. While this enhancement allows
the IoT source to send its data using one single message
(without any bearer instantiation request), it may repre-
sent a significant burden for the MME.
For lack of room, the handshakes of the three enhanced
procedures are not shown here, but they can be found in [4].
At last, we remark that, although the above enhancements
have been introduced mainly to reduce the IoT energy con-
sumption, in this paper we focus on their impact on the EPC,
not on the IoT sources.
C. IoT traffic model
As mentioned, whenever the time interval between subse-
quent packets of an IoT source is larger than the Inactivity
Timer of the eNB, the bearer is released and a new bearer
has to be re-established, if the IoT source has some new
traffic to send/receive. Depending on the IoT traffic pattern,
the time between subsequent packets may vary significantly
and so does the number of bearer requests of an IoT source.
In the following, we adopt the traffic model described in
the 3GPP standard [10] for MTC. According to [10], traffic
sources are organized in groups and, within each group,
packet transmissions are quasi-synchronous. As an example,
consider a group of sensors monitoring a geographical area
and programmed to send an alarm to a server in the Internet
when a specific event occurs. Upon an event occurrence, the
sensors of the group that are closer to the event generate
and transmit the alarm first, while the others react with some
delay. In other words, a chain reaction triggers alarms from
the sensors belonging to the same group, leading to a quasi-
synchronous behavior. In particular, in [10] each group activity
is divided in periods of duration T and, in each period, the
quasi-synchronicity of the sensors described above, is captured
by a beta(3,4) distribution representing the aggregate traffic
generated within a group over time. The above system model
is also depicted in Fig. 2.
Interestingly, the 3GPP model for the aggregate IoT traffic
has been used in [9] to derive a model of traffic generation
at each IoT source within a group. Specifically, [9] models
an IoT source as a Markov Chain including two states, named
alarm and regular operation, which we denote in the following
by A and R, respectively. The period T of the IoT traffic
pattern is divided into an arbitrary number of slots N , each
of duration t, i.e., N = Tt . In state A, the generic IoT
source sends packets following a Poisson distribution with
Fig. 2: Overview of the adopted system model.
mean 1 = 1 packet/slot. In state R, instead, the IoT source
transmits packets following a Poisson distribution with mean
2 = 0:0005
t
T packet/slot, i.e., in state R an IoT source
transmits on average 0:0005 packet/s; such traffic represents
control packets at the application layer such as keep-alive
procedures or synchronization packets. Both in state R and
A, the packet size is set to L = 100 bytes [9].
At each time slot n, with n = f1; :::; Ng, the IoT source
may move from one state to the other. When in state A,
the IoT source moves to R in the next slot with probability
1. On the contrary, the transition from R to A occurs with
probability fs(n), which depends on the considered slot (s
denotes the generic slot in which a transition occurs). To let
the aggregate traffic generated by the IoT sources match the
beta(3,4) shape, fs(n) is directly obtained from the sampling
of such distribution [9]:
fs(n) = beta(nt)
t
T
; (1)
where beta(nt) is the beta(3,4) shape sampled at time nt.
IV. CHARACTERIZING IOT CONTROL TRAFFIC
Here we draw on the single-source IoT traffic model pre-
sented in [9] and characterize the IoT control traffic load, in
terms of:
 fP , the pmf of the number of time slots between two
subsequent visits to state A by an IoT source with at least
one packet transmission. Such a quantity also corresponds
to the number of slots between two consecutive forward-
ing operations by the MME towards the S-GW, related to
data originated by the same IoT source, when the Control
Plane C-IoT optimization is in place (Sec. IV-A);
 E[M ], the average number of packets per second that the
MME has to forward to the S-GW for a single IoT source,
when the Control Plane C-IoT optimization is adopted
(Sec. IV-A);
 E[B], the average number of bearer instantiations per
second that each IoT source requests, when any of the
bearer establishment procedures introduced in Sec. IV-B
is in place.
A. Computing fP and E[M ]
We first consider the Control Plane C-IoT optimization, in
which the MME acts as a relay for each packet transmit-
ted/received by an IoT source. To compute fP , we neglect
the packets transmitted in state R – a fair assumption if T is
sufficiently short since, on average, an IoT source transmits a
packet every 2000 s while being in R. Under these conditions,
fP corresponds to the pmf of the number of slots between
two alarms relayed by the MME for the same IoT source. We
denote such a quantity by P ; note that the P number of slots
may span over several subsequent periods, each of duration
T .
Let us now underline an important property of the IoT traffic
model we adopted. Considering (1), an IoT source moves from
state R to state A at a given time slot with a probability that
does not depend on the past. Thus, the number of slots between
two subsequent packet transmissions does not depend on the
period in which the first packet was transmitted, but only on
the particular slot within that period. We then compute fP
through the law of total probability considering N different
cases, one for each slot in a period:
fP (m) =
NX
n=1
fP j (mjn)f (n); (2)
where  represents the slot of the period in which the IoT
source last visited state A and transmitted a packet. From (2),
we have to compute fP j (mjn) and f (n) in order to obtain
fP (m). We start by computing fP j (mjn):
fP j (mjn) = fj (mjn)(1 e 1)+
1X
k=1
m 1X
i=k
Rk;n(i)fj (m ijmod(n+i;N))(1 e 1); (3)
where (i)  is the time interval between two subsequent visits
to A, (ii) (1 e 1) is the probability that the tagged IoT source
transmits at least one packet when visiting state A, and (iii)
Rk;n(i) represents the probability that an IoT source visits k
times state A without transmitting any packet, the first time
in slot n, the last one i slots after n. More specifically, (3)
is computed as the sum of the probabilities of the following
events:
 the IoT source visits state A only once, m slots after
n, and it transmits at least one packet (first term of the
right-hand side of (3));
 the IoT source visits k+1 times state A after transmitting
a packet in slot n, but it transmits (at least) one packet
only during its last visit to state A, m slots after n. As
an example, for k=1, the source visits A twice: once
i slots (with i < m) after n (without transmitting any
packet), and once m slots after n (transmitting at least one
packet). Indeed, the second term of the right-hand side
of (3), for each intermediate i, is given by the product of
the probability Rk;n(i) and the probability that the new
transition to state A happens in m i slots.
To complete the computation of fP j (mjn), we need
to derive fj (mjn) and Rk;n(i). Directly from (1),
fj (mjn) is computed as the probability of having:
one transition from A to R (with probability 1 in slot
n + 1), m   2 slots where there is no transition, and
one transition from R to A exactly m slots after n:
fj (mjn) = fs(mod(n+m;N))
n+m 1Y
j=n+2
(1 fs(mod(j;N)) ;
(4)
with fj (1jn) = 0.
Rk;n(i) is instead computed recursively, accounting for the
probability that after k visits to state A, an IoT source has not
transmitted any packet yet. More in detail, R1;n(i) is given
by:
R1;n(i) = fj (ijn)e 1; (5)
i.e., as the probability that the IoT source visits A once, i
slots after n, without transmitting any packet. Rk;n(i) can be
computed, through the law of total probability, as:
Rk;n(i)=
m 1X
j=k 1
Rk 1;n(j)fj (i jjmod(n+j;N))e 1: (6)
The summation on the right-hand side of (6) includes a term
for each intermediate j (Rk 1;n(j)), where the probability of
visiting state A for the k 1-th time without transmitting a
packet, j slots after slot n, multiplies the probability that the
new transition to state A happens in i j slots.
Finally, we compute fP j (mjn) by leveraging on the result
provided in [9], i.e.,
f (n) = fs(n): (7)
The intuition behind (7) is that fs(n) is strictly linked with the
probability that the IoT source transmits a packet (see (1)).
From fP we also obtain E[M ], which can be obtained as
the ratio between (i) the average number of packets transmitted
by the tagged IoT source while in A, conditioned to the fact
that the IoT source transmits at least one packet, and (ii) the
average interval of time between two subsequent visits to A
with at least one packet transmission by the IoT source, i.e.,
E[P ]t:
E[M ] =
P1
k=1 e
 1=(k   1)!
(1  e 1) 
1
E[P ]t
; (8)
where the first term on the right hand side is directly obtained
from the Poisson pmf with 1 = 1.
B. Computing E[B]
We now focus on the Inactivity Timer TI expiration. When-
ever such an event occurs, a new packet transmission by an IoT
source triggers a new bearer-related procedure. Specifically,
the standard case requires a re-attach and bearer establishment,
the Attach without PDN connectivity implies a new bearer
establishment, the User Plane C-IoT optimization just requires
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
T
I
[s]
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
E
[B
]
simulations
analysis
Fig. 3: E[B] vs. TI : Comparison between analytical and
simulation results.
a bearer resume procedure since in this case the bearer is
just suspended, while the Control Plane C-IoT optimization
demands directly the MME to initiate a bearer establishment
procedure. Although the control traffic load induced by the
timer expiration varies depending on the procedure that is in
place, in all cases it is essential to compute the average number
of times per second the timer expires, i.e., E[B].
Given the definition of P in Sec. IV-A, we compute E[B]
as the ratio of the probability that a packet triggers a bearer
request (P(Pt > TI)), to the average time between two
consecutive packet transmissions by the same IoT source
(E[P ]t), i.e.,
E[B] =
P(Pt > TI)
E[P ]t
: (9)
where P(Pt > TI) can be directly computed from fP .
V. MODEL VALIDATION AND EXPLOITATION
In this section we first validate the analytical results ob-
tained in Sec. IV, i.e., E[M ] and E[B], against simulations
(Sec. V-A). Then we exploit our model to derive interesting
comparisons among the standard and IoT enhanced bearer
instantiation procedures (Sec. V-B).
A. Model Validation
To validate our model, we developed a Matlab simulator
that implements the traffic model described in Sec. III-C. The
parameters we used are as follows: T = 10 s (as specified
in [4]), t = 10 ms, and TI ranging between 0 and 50 s.
We performed extended experiments and compared E[M ] and
E[B] obtained analytically and via simulation.
The results obtained for E[B] are shown in Fig. 3, as TI
varies. As expected, the number of bearers per second an IoT
source requests, decreases monotonically with increasing TI .
However, we recall that, the larger the TI , the more context
information the EPC has to store. More importantly, Fig. 3
highlights that the curve obtained via simulation and the one
obtained analytically perfectly match, thus showing that our
analysis perfectly captures the number of bearers per second
each IoT source requests to the EPC.
For sake of brevity, we do not show here the results for
E[M ] but we mention that, for this metric, the difference
between analysis and simulation is less than 0:04% in the
worst case.
B. Comparison among bearer instantiation procedures
We now characterize the average load that each component
of the EPC has to handle in the bearer instantiation procedures
presented above. First, in Table I we present the number
of messages that each component has to dispatch for each
instantiated bearer, as per the 3GPP standard specifications
[4]. In the table, we do not account for the initial RRC
connection establishment, since it is a mandatory procedure
involving only the IoT source and the eNB, as per classical
data forwarding. The number of messages each component
has to handle, however, includes those required to release
(or suspend, in case of an User-Plane C-IoT optimization)
a bearer, since, for each bearer established, a bearer is also
released. As far as the Control-Plane C-IoT optimization is
concerned, we account for two different operations: (i) bearer
establishment/release and (ii) MME data forwarding. In the
latter operation, the eNB piggybags the packet received from
the IoT source in an S1-AP initial message, and the MME
checks the integrity and decrypts the packet before forwarding
it to the correct S-GW. Similarly, the IoT source has to simply
piggybag its data packets in the messages transmitted during
the RRC establishment procedure, without the need for any
additional control message.
To characterize the traffic load that each component has
to handle due to bearer-related procedures, we consider a
scenario with 10 eNBs for each S-GW, each eNB covering
100 IoT sources, 1 MME, and 1 P-GW. The number of S-GWs
in the system instead varies from 10 to 100, which allows us
to analyse scenarios with different control load. As suggested
in [11], the capacity of the different components of the EPC
can be expressed in terms of messages/s. Fig. 4 depicts the
control load that each entity has to handle in each scenario,
in terms of the control message rate. For what concern S-GW,
eNB, and UE, the quantities refer to a single entity and not to
TABLE I: Number of messages that each EPC component has
to process for every bearer instantiation
Procedure ] Msg. ] Msg. ] Msg. ] Msg ] Msg.IoT eNB MME S-GW P-GW
Standard 6 6 12 4 1Bearer Inst.
Attach w/o 5 5 10 3 1PDN Con.
User-Plane 2 6 5 2 0C-IoT Opt.
Control-Plane 0 2 5 3 1C-IoT Bearer
Control-Plane 0 1 1+Decrypt. 0 0C-IoT Data +Integrity
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(c) User-Plane C-IoT opt.
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Fig. 4: Number of messages that each EPC component has to dispatch per second, as the number of S-GWs varies and with
TI = 0.
the whole set. As an example, the total message rate an MME
has to handle under the Control-Plane C-IoT optimization, is:
E[MCP ] = E[B]  5Q+ E[M ] DQ+ QE[P ] ; (10)
where (i) Q is the total number of IoT sources under a
specific MME, (ii) 5 is the number of messages that the
MME has to handle for each bearer establishment/release in
the Control-Plane C-IoT optimization, (iii) 1E[P ] is the message
rate that the MME has to handle for each IoT source due to
control traffic forwarding, and (iv) D is the integrity check
and decryption load that the MME has to handle for each
packet relayed for an IoT source, expressed in terms in number
of messages. Computing D may not be trivial. Nevertheless,
studies on commodity processors show that nowadays a packet
of size L requires few hundreds of floating-point operations for
encryption/decryption [12]; similar results are obtained also
for packet integrity check. Since a single control message
requires (roughly) one million floating-point operations [8], we
neglected the load due to packet integrity check and decryption
operations.
Fig. 4 further highlights that, in all bearer procedures, the
MME is the one that has to dispatch the highest number of
messages. In the best case (User-Plane C-IoT optimization),
the MME still dispatches seven times more messages than
any other entity. Finally, we conclude that, under the Control
Plane C-IoT optimization, the interaction with the IoT sources
is reduced to the minimum, but the control load on the MME
remains comparable to the one observed for the other bearer
establishment procedures.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the case where a cellular network supports
massive IoT communications and analytically derived the con-
sequent control traffic load on the EPC. Specifically, assuming
a 3GPP-based model for IoT traffic sources, we chracterized
the distribution of the time interval between two consecutive
transmissions by the same source. Through this expression,
we computed the control traffic that the EPC has to handle
due to the support of IoT sources, when different connectivity
procedures are in place, namely, the standard procedure,
the Attach without PDN connectivity, the User Plane C-IoT
optimization, and the Control Plane C-IoT optimization. Our
analysis was validated through simulation results and provided
some novel insights on the impact of massive IoT traffic on the
EPC components, as well as on effectiveness of the different
connectivity modes foreseen by the 3GPP standard.
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